Zayed University

ZU Scholars
All Works
1-1-2021

Data-fusion for epidemiological analysis of covid-19 variants in
UAE
Anoud Bani-Hani
Zayed University

Anaïs Lavorel
Staffordshire University

Newel Bessadet
Keele University

Follow this and additional works at: https://zuscholars.zu.ac.ae/works
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Medicine and Health Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Bani-Hani, Anoud; Lavorel, Anaïs; and Bessadet, Newel, "Data-fusion for epidemiological analysis of
covid-19 variants in UAE" (2021). All Works. 4209.
https://zuscholars.zu.ac.ae/works/4209

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ZU Scholars. It has been accepted for inclusion in All
Works by an authorized administrator of ZU Scholars. For more information, please contact
Yrjo.Lappalainen@zu.ac.ae, nikesh.narayanan@zu.ac.ae.

Computers, Materials & Continua
DOI:10.32604/cmc.2021.015355
Article

Tech Science Press

Data-Fusion for Epidemiological Analysis of Covid-19 Variants in UAE
Anoud Bani-Hani1, * , Anaïs Lavorel2 and Newel Bessadet3
1
Zayed University, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Staffordshire University, Stoke-on-Trent, ST4 2DE, United Kingdom
3
Keele University, Newcastle, ST5 5BG, United Kingdom
*
Corresponding Author: Anoud Bani-Hani. Email: Anoud.Bani-Hani@zu.ac.ae
Received: 17 November 2020; Accepted: 15 March 2021
2

Abstract: Since December 2019, a new pandemic has appeared causing a
considerable negative global impact. The SARS-CoV-2 first emerged from
China and transformed to a global pandemic within a short time. The virus
was further observed to be spreading rapidly and mutating at a fast pace, with
over 5,775 distinct variations of the virus observed globally (at the time of submitting this paper). Extensive research has been ongoing worldwide in order
to get a better understanding of its behaviour, influence and more importantly,
ways for reducing its impact. Data analytics has been playing a pivotal role
in this research to obtain valuable insights into understanding and fighting
against the spread of infection. However, this is time and resource intensive,
making it difficult to observe and quickly identify the impact of mutations.
Factors such as the spread or virulence could explain the three months delay
in revealing the new virus variant in the UK. This paper presents an extensive
correlation analysis of the effect caused by the different SARS-CoV-2 strains,
and their influence on the population across diverse factors, such as propagation and fatality rates, during the peak of the pandemic, with a focus on
two major countries in the Middle East, the United Arab Emirate (UAE) and
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). This research aims to investigate the
epidemiological behaviour of the Coronavirus’ genomic variants over time in
the UAE, compared with the KSA, where correlation analysis is carried out
for a number of cases, deaths and their statistical deviations. The results of the
analysis highlight very interesting insights into the epidemiological impact of
the Covid-19 genomic behaviour in both countries, which could lead to important actions taken to minimize the impact on wider public health, possibly
saving lives, and the economy. For instance, our method identifies a potential
correlation between a spike in the number of deaths per case of 5.5 observed in
the UAE by March 24th, with the emergence of new genomic variants of the
Coronavirus (G0_c, G0_e1 and G0_e2). Our proposed methodology can be
instrumental in identifying and classifying new variations of the virus earlier,
and possibly predicting foreseeable mutations through pattern analysis, hence
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creating proactive measures to control its spread, such as the recent case of the
new virus variant, recently discovered in the UK.
Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; genome; covid-19; public health; pandemic;
epidemiology; case study; United Arab Emirates; UAE; Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia; KSA

1 Introduction
At the time of submitting this paper, more than 87 million cases of Covid-19 have been
identified globally [1], with almost 2 million deaths and more than 5,775 different variations
observed [2]. Due to its fast propagation, the virus has evolved quickly, which required more extensive research across several domains in order to improve detection, treatment, and the search for a
vaccine [3]. Since January 2020, numerous research efforts have been reported and several datasets
were generated [3,4]. Moreover, not all infected people present symptoms, which makes it even
harder to control its spread [5], while massive testing is a highly demanding process that requires
considerable resources, not available to the majority of the world [6]. Therefore, the accurate
number of infected cases can be difficult to identify [7]. Furthermore, the virus proved to cause
other conditions, such as MIS-C disease observed in people under 21 [8], neurological impacts [8],
persistent symptoms [9,10], in addition to the ongoing evolution of its virulence [11,12].
Genome analysis of the virus and its variants has been an important source of information
in helping understand its detection, behaviour, characteristics, development history, as well as
developing treatments and vaccines [13–20]. Genomic analysis has also been utilised to detect the
virus mutations and their potential impact on its spread and possible predictions [20–23]. However,
these mutations are still under investigation to prove their validity [23]. Significant work is required
to understand the virus and the correlations between the genomes and their behaviour. Moreover,
most of the closest research to our work in this paper, genomic mutation analysis, focuses either
on the origin of the virus or on the impact of specific mutations. The former is done using a
similar approach to ours for genome grouping, however, they concentrate primarily on the study
of the path that the virus has taken (where does the different Covid-19 sequences come from?).
The latter is mainly supported by Machine Learning [24,25] to explore the different mutations
observed and search for their impact in larger populations across countries or continents, but
without grouping genomes upstream and focusing only on correlations with mutations such as
in [26]. Our approach ensures timely identification of new variants of the Coronavirus.
In our paper, the main methods used for the comparisons are alignments [27] and phylogenetic
trees [28]. Alignment is used to arrange sequences, one above the other. The sequence is then
altered for comparison as illustrated in Fig. 1. Using these alignments, phylogenetic trees are
created, which are similar to evolutionary trees, however genomic sequences are applied. They
allow us to graphically observe distances between sequences based on the mutations. Domain
knowledge is required to understand the impact of a specific mutation, however, in our approach
we compare the genomes of the different virus variants by grouping and comparing them with
each other according to their likelihood, like comparing a set of pictures together.
While the results, at the picture level, may not provide precise identification of the pixels that
differ, other forms of data can be derived from it. In the case of genomic sequences, it could
show trends of evolution and virus variations that tend to emerge, which can potentially be an
indicator of how this crisis is being handled geographically. Genomic sequences have been studied
to enhance the understanding of the epidemic in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and identify
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its origin [29], but there are no other studies which attempt to report the work presented in this
paper. More detailed analysis has also been carried out, for other parts of the world, particularly
on the potential impact of the virus’s mutations, symptoms, severity, and its spread [30,31].

Figure 1: Resume of the methodology applied
The goal of this article is to analyse genomic mutations of the Covid-19 virus using groups
of genomes based on their similarity instead of specific nucleotides or amino-acid proteins as it is
usually performed [32]. Our work focuses specifically on the UAE, which is reported for the first
time. It will also review how the UAE was exposed to the virus; the genome diversity observed
during the first wave of the pandemic, the potential impact of the countermeasures against this
diversity, the diversity observed with its impact at the country scale. The same analysis is also
done for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and compared with UAE.
Using groups of genomes instead of their nucleotides can reduce the time required to identify
new variants of the virus. It can be used before the nucleotides exploration to reduce the scale
of possibility and allow us to uncover more important mutations in shorter times. Perhaps, it can
help avoid scenarios as the one currently faced by the UK and the world, amid the new variant
of the virus, which was discovered after three months from its emergence [33].
There are many Covid-19 related research studies and analyses, but mostly focused on countries greatest affected with the pandemic including India, China, USA, Europe and more recently,
with a particular focus on the UK, following the emergence of the new virus variant [34]. To the
best of the authors’ knowledge, there is very little research on countries like the UAE, the KSA
and the region as a whole. This paper focuses mainly on the case of the UAE, as required by the
project funder, where the KSA is also considered due to its close geographical location and its
differences in population repartition (larger country with less dense population), which allows the
investigation of the potential impact of proximities. Further, the UAE and the KSA are important
countries for the movement of people. The UAE is a principal hub between the east and the west,
and the KSA is a religious destination for tens of millions of visitors from all around the world.
The movement of people has a direct impact on the spread of this pandemic. In summary, the
contributions of this study include:
1. The proposed methodology allowing for a quicker detection of the epidemiological impact
of new Coronavirus variants, unlike existing approaches, which are time and resource
consuming.
2. The first time for this analysis to be conducted for the UAE and the KSA.

3898

CMC, 2021, vol.68, no.3

3. Results which show, for the first time, a number of important insights about the Coronavirus genomic variations and their epidemiological impacts, which can help the government review its measures for controlling the spread of the infection.
4. A demonstration of the power of data-fusion for the intended purpose and highlights
future directions for research.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the environment
setup, the data sources and types. Section 3 describes the proposed methodology for all steps
taken in the research. Section 4 presents the results and a comprehensive analysis of various
correlations. Finally, Section 5 concludes the research work and discusses research limitations and
future directions.
2 Resources and Environment
To execute this analysis, several sources of data were combined. We obtained permission to
access and use mRNA genome sequences data from the GISAID database as presented in [35].
This includes 32 samples from the United Arab Emirates and 142 samples from the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia from January 29th, 2020 to May 4th, 2020. To identify the closest genomes to
the one observed in China, the mRNA genome reference from NCBI database was also added
to the genome dataset [36]. Even if the genome dataset contains sequences with up to 4.57%
missing nucleotides, the majority were complete. As the genomes were grouped according to their
similarities, all genomes were kept, reducing the impact of missing data. The genomic analysis was
performed using the MEGA-X software [37]. As the goal of this article is to study correlations
between genomic diversity and its potential impact on the epidemic, other statistical data related
to the number of the cases and deaths were required. Hence, the number of cases and number
of accumulated daily deaths was retrieved from ‘Our World in Data website’ [38]. The worldwide
countermeasure tracker created by Oxford University [39] was then correlated with the observed
genomic group. More specifically, the focus of this work is on the potential factors that could
impact diversity in the genomes observed such as population lockdown and travel restrictions.
Genomes were aligned and plotted using Mega-X, while structured data was analysed using
Python 3 through plots.
3 Methodology
First, genomic diversity was analysed using Mega-X as it is one of the main open-source
software applications available for genomic analysis. The sequences were aligned using MUSCLE
alignment [40]. As it can be observed in Fig. 1 part 3. The MUSCLE alignment allows for
highlighting proximity between sequences, based on the mutations that occurred. However, the
translated protein sequences might not correspond to the real protein’s sequences encountered.
Nevertheless, Muscle alignment is one of the most used methods for sequences’ alignment and
mutation tracking. The distance matrix was then computed, and the corresponding phylogenetic
tree created using the UPGMA method [40]. Groups were visually identified using the phylogenetic
tree, to avoid having too many groups. Groups with more than 30 samples were split into
subgroups. After identifying the groups, the information about the genomes in each group (ID,
Date, Location) were aggregated. Then the diversity was observed over time and location by
creating a small dataset containing genome ID, location, group, and date. Subsequently, analysis
was performed according to this data fusion.
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The second phase allows for the observation of potential group repartition which changes
according to time or location, or if it remains constant. Furthermore, the diversity of genomes
was merged with the countermeasures using Python 3.7, such as lockdowns and air travelling
restriction. The goal was to study potential impacts of these measures against the diversity
observed. Finally, the diversity of the genomes was combined with the epidemy factor as to the
evolution of the number of cases, deaths, recovery with their rates of fatality (death/cases) or
the rate of recovery (recovery/cases). To do so, dates were used considering a potential margin
of fifteen days as it corresponded to the average time of recovery. The goal was to search for
the correlation between groups and the evolutions of these elements as it was observed for the
mutation D614G.
For this purpose and in the case of the UAE, first we focused on the genomic diversity to
study if some specific mutations were observed in the country, based on the samples retrieved.
Second, we analysed the epidemiological behaviour, including nature and pattern for the first wave,
search for potential factors that could have impacted the observed behaviours (mutations observed,
diversity, risk factors etc.), and finally, we compared the UAE with the KSA, for any similarities,
otherwise, why there were differences. In order not to confuse the reader, all groups of genomes
were defined based on the fusion of all genomic data as illustrated in Fig. 10. In summary, the
research methodology is divided into seven main steps as illustrated in Fig. 1.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 United Arab Emirates
The genomes sequences in the UAE were retrieved during the beginning of the pandemic
in the country. These genomes revealed which SARS-CoV-2 genomes were detected in the UAE
and their different variants. This dataset has already been used in order to understand the source
of these genomes [41]. Therefore, in this article, we focused more on the potential impact of
this diversity.
The UAE genome dataset showed a repartition into four main groups with two dominants,
named herein, G0_d and G0_e, which are the closest groups to the genomes observed in China
as presented in Fig. 3. Even after dividing these groups further, G0_d1 remained the most noted
subgroup of the genomes as depicted in Fig. 2, while the different groups illustrate the shared
ancestors or mutations that were observed. Furthermore, it can be observed that some genomes
are more isolated than others as for the EPI_ISL_463740. This difference could correspond to
either an imported case that did not spread in the UAE, isolation of the case, genomic characteristics that led to a low spread of the infection, low appearance during the sequencing period, or
due to milder symptoms on the infected people. It also appears from Fig. 4 that G0_d was mainly
observed at the beginning of the sequencing dates, then it was overtaken by G0_e before both
groups stabilised. A possible explanation could be that G0_d and G0_e were both introduced by
travellers, which led to a time localised cluster followed by a lower spread of infection. In other
words, as the number of people infected were in closed environments during their travels, the virus
had the opportunity to spread quickly to other passengers as the correlation between international
travelling and epidemic spread risk was proved in [42]. However, due to the repartition of the
sample, this stabilisation could also have been due to unrelated factors as there was not enough
data to prove it. Moreover, even in subgroups, it appears that repartition of the genomes seemed
to change over time. A possible explanation is that the government handled the epidemic well
and successfully isolated infected cases to reduce its spread. However as for G0_e3, the number
of genomes rose, which could be either due to a possibility that the first detected cases did not
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correspond to the first cases detected in the country and it has spread before being identified or
that the countermeasures did not succeed to maintain the spread or else the restrictions put in
place were not respected or perhaps several cases were imported a few days apart.

Figure 2: Radial phylogenetic tree of UAE Covid-19 of (a) G0 subgroups; (b) smallest groups
identified

Figure 3: Genome diversity in UAE (a) in G0; (b) in minimal size groups
4.2 Epidemy Behaviour in United Arab Emirates
From the epidemy behaviour analysis displayed in Fig. 5, it appears that three different steps
in the propagation were observed. These steps correspond to the time when the number of cases
increased as it was observed on the 4th of April 2020 and the 7th of May 2020. As mass testing
began on the 10th of April 2020 in UAE, it is suggested that this rise of cases was due to an
event that happened five days before, as it corresponded to the average delay of the incubation
period reported in [43]. However, no correlation was observed between the genome’s introduction
and the number of cases. Still, the number of deaths per case does not follow the same pattern.
It can be observed that this curve contains three different spikes on the 23rd of March 2020, the
1st of April 2020 and the 13th of May 2020. On these dates, the cases were higher than the other
dates. Moreover, they do not correspond to a specific event such as the beginning of the week,
or a weekend, and these spikes are more likely linked to a delay in information sharing.
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Figure 4: Genome diversity in UAE over time (a) in G0; (b) in minimal size groups

Figure 5: Death and genomes changes with (a) 8, (b) 11.6; (c) 13, (d) 16.6 days delay for G0
subgroups
According to [44], the average delay between the appearance of symptoms and deaths is
approximately eight days. The KSA, for instance, showed a delay of 11.6 days [44]. Both intervals
were tested with and without the incubation periods. It was difficult to correlate death rates with
genomes, as illustrated in Figs. 6 and 7, which were obtained by plotting death rates per case.
Instead, it seems that some other factors had an impact upon the fatality rate, otherwise, we would
have expected a more unified graph. As the first rise was observed more than one month after
the introduction of G0_d1, it can be suggested that this genome group did not have an impact
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on the results shown in Figs. 8 and 9. Moreover, using the intervals of 11.6 and 16.6 days, a
potential correlation between genomic diversity and death/cases rate appears. Indeed, if the first
picture corresponds to the introduction of G0_e, the second one could correspond to the cases
linked to the G0_e introduction in the country. In other words, if the first picture corresponds
to G0_e introduction, the second one could correspond to the person that was infected by that
cluster. As the cluster was probably quickly identified and their contacts informed, only two waves
were observed.

Figure 6: Covid-19 cases, death and tests rates in UAE
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Figure 7: Death and genomes changes with (a) 8, (b) 11.6; (c) 13, (d) 16.6 days delay for min
subgroup

Figure 8: Deaths/cases and genomes with (a) 8, (b) 11.6 (c) 13, (d) 16.6 days delay for G0
subgroup
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Figure 9: Deaths/cases and genomes with (a) 8, (b) 11.6 (c) 13, (d) 16.6 days delay for min group
As we do not have enough information to ensure that these cases correspond to the G0_e
genome group, further study is required. However, if these characteristics are not observed in the
other countries that faced the epidemic with similar specifications (close geographical location,
similar curve for the number of cases), then it could be possible to highlight a correlation
between the genomic diversity and the epidemy characteristics in a country. Indeed, even if a
single mutation could change the behaviour of the virus, grouping the genomes would allow the
observation of trends and new emerging groups.
A correlation between the lockdown and the rise of cases could be suggested, however,
this relationship should not impact the ratio of death per case, except, if it was due to some
restrictions. To ensure this theory, it was required to look at the countermeasures taken by the
government. To test this genomic correlation with the fatality rate, the UAE was compared to
the KSA.
4.3 United Arab Emirates Compared to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
The KSA is one of the neighbouring countries to the UAE. Furthermore, it has gathered
more genomes than UAE. The genome repartition showed two groups of genomes G1 and G2,
which correspond to a new speciation of the SARS-CoV-2, which were not observed in the
UAE, as shown in Figs. 2 and 10. These groups correspond to mutations perceived of more than
1% compared to the Chinese observed genomes. Even if this distance is low, considering the
length of the reference genome, it represents around 299 mutations (considering each nucleotide
missing/added as a mutation) using as a reference the length of the Chinese genome.
Still the main part of the genomes is localised in G0 but with a different repartition as the
main subgroup is G0_e. Furthermore, compared to the UAE, GO_e3 and G0_e1 are not the
dominant subgroups of G0_e. In fact, as shown in Fig. 11, the main subgroup observed in G0_e
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is G0_e9. The absence of the G0_c can also be noted at this point. Though only 190 genomes
were retrieved between the 29th of January 2020 and the 4th of May 2020, some other groups
might exist but were not observed or sequenced. Grouping the genomes according to division of
the phylogenetic tree allowed the creation of groups based on their shared ancestors. Due to the
presence of both G0_e groups in the UAE and SA, the previous hypothesis linking this group
to the fatality wave seems less probable as only one wave was observed in the KSA, (Fig. 14).
However, as another group of genomes or a specific subgroup of G0_e could be linked to it, the
potential correlation between the genomic diversity and the epidemy behaviour was studied in the
KSA. The spread of the infection showed to be more controlled in the KSA compared to the
UAE over time, (Fig. 12).

Figure 10: Radial phylogenetic tree view of (a) all genomes; (b) G0 detailed; (c) G0_d and G0_e
detailed

Figure 11: Genomic repartition G0, G0_d and G0_e in the KSA (a–c) and in the UAE and the
KSA (d–f)

3906

CMC, 2021, vol.68, no.3

Figure 12: Genome diversity over time for G0, G0_d, G0_e in KSA (a–c) and in UAE &
KSA (d–f)
4.4 United Arab Emirates Epidemy Behaviour Compared to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Epidemy Behaviour
As can be observed in Fig. 13, UAE and KSA shared a similar behaviour for the number of
cases and number of deaths per millions inhabitant which looked exponential. However, Fig. 14
showed clearly some divergence in terms of death rates. According to Fig. 13, it appears that
the epidemy was more prevalent in UAE than KSA at its commencement. This is based on the
number of cases and death per millions which are higher which could be linked to the population
density as observed in Tab. 1 based on [45,46].
Indeed, as the population of the UAE is much denser than that of the KSA, the risk of seeing
the virus spread was higher in the UAE. In comparison to the UAE, the KSA only observed one
wave of fatalities, as shown in Fig. 14. This could imply that something happened in the UAE
that was not observed in the KSA. In fact, as many tests performed in the UAE were soon after
the second fatality wave, explaining why the third wave in the UAE’s death/cases looked smoother
than any other. One benefit of mass testing is the early detection of asymptomatic patients, which
is extremely important to limit the spread of the infection.
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Figure 13: Comparison of the UAE and the KSA Covid-19 cases and death rate
With regards to the genomic group’s relation to the epidemy behaviour, only the 11.6 days
delay between detection and deaths were considered as a precise estimation. It appeared for both
countries that some specific genome groups emerged before the first death was observed as shown

3908

CMC, 2021, vol.68, no.3

in Figs. 5, 7 and 15. Still, due to the characteristics of the virus, this correlation cannot be
proved, and some deaths could have happened earlier, but were not noticed due to an absence of
symptoms and the fact that some deaths which were linked to pneumonia were in fact linked to
the Coronavirus [47]. Moreover, as the patients’ history also mattered (medical history, age, gender,
ethnicity, etc.) [48,49], these graphs could be showing, only, the impact of events that had put
vulnerable people in contact with the virus too. As data shows a positive correlation between the
death rate and the identified genomic diversity in this study, other measures taken by the UAE,
such as the ‘stay at home’ policy could have also helped reduce the diversity of the genomes by
limiting contact and spread of the infection. This could also explain the reduction of mortality
per case. However, for this paper, we assume that the numbers reflect the reality observed and we
attempt to focus on identifying which genomic groups could have more impact than others and
find out if these groups present some specific mutations.

Figure 14: Comparison of the UAE and the KSA Covisd-19 death per cases and tests
Table 1: Country characteristics and population size

Aged 70 older
Diabetes prevalence
Female smokers
Male smokers
Population density
Median age
Aged 65 older
Life expectancy
Gross domestic product per capita
Population in 2020

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

United Arab Emirates

1.845
17.72
1.8
25.4
15.322
31.9
3.295
75.13
49045.411
34,813,871

0.526
17.26
1.2
37.4
112.442
34.0
1.144
77.97
67293.483
9,890,402
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4.5 Correlation with Genome Diversity
It was observed, for the UAE, that no death was recorded even after two weeks from the
introduction of G0_d1, G0_d2 and G0_d3, Fig. 7. It can then be suggested that these groups
either have a low R0 (propagation rate) due to their quick detection, or genomic specifications, or
a high level of discipline by the population toward social distancing and government’s measures.
The same phenomenon was observed for G0_e2, G0_e4, G0_e5, G0_e6, G0_e9 and G0_b, Fig. 15.
As some genomes were observed for only a limited number of samples (less than three) where no
correlation could be made at this point.
The first main fatality rate observed corresponds to the effect of G0_e2 and G0_e3 introduction, followed by the emergence of G0_c and G0_e1, Fig. 9. However, G0_e3 was also observed
in the KSA on the 1st of May 2020, which did not affect the fatality rate drastically, Fig. 15.

Figure 15: Evolution of deaths and genomes with 11.6 days for the different groups
In the KSA, the main genome groups observed during the picture of fatality are: G0_e9,
G0_e8, which appeared along with G1, G0_e1, G0_d2 and G0_e7. As G1 and G2 were not
observed in the UAE, it could be assumed that the mutations encountered in these two groups
were not the ones impacting the fatality observed in the UAE. Therefore, the only genome group
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remaining that could explain our observation was G0_c as it does not appear in the KSA and is
the furthest from the other genomic groups.
5 Conclusion and Future Directions
We know that different genomes of the same virus family can induce different behaviours
such as difference in R0 (propagation rate), fatality rate and symptoms (presence and severity).
We also know that individuals do not react the same way to a virus and its variants, depending
mainly on their immune systems, their medical history, their age, etc. In this paper, we focused on
studying the potential impact of Covid-19 genome groups at a country scale, the UAE compared
to the KSA. This is the first time such a study is reported for these selected countries. Based
on our classifications of the Covid-19 genomic variations, obtained in the UAE and the KSA,
we performed a number of correlations, covering the emergence of these variations by date, and
the analysis of possible relationships between the virus variants, number of infected cases and
death rates. The goal was to identify correlations between the genomic diversity and their possible
epidemiological impact. The results show some good insights, which uncover some interesting
correlations and their interpretations. These insights are not only important to understand the
virus’ development and changes over time, but also identifies which of the virus variants could
be behind some epidemiological impact. These interpretations can help countries take the right
measures, in time, to tackle the spread of the epidemy and plan appropriate resources.
Studying and searching for a specific mutation’s impact is time and resource consuming due
a number of factors. This causes delays between the emergence of any mutation and when its
impact is detection. Our approach, presented in this paper, can reduce this delay and allow earlier
detections of new virus variants. Reducing this time will allow us to keep a better track of the
epidemy and could help in the reduction of cases and the control of the spread of the infection.
Indeed, using such methodology can orient the research toward a specific set of genomes with
common mutations, which can be investigated further. Such a study would be useful in preparation
for a new wave, and if correlations are made between specific groups of genomes and their
impact on public health, the countermeasures and the health care response could be adapted.
For example, if the fatality rate is indeed related to some new genomic groups, the detection
of such groups would lead to localised lockdowns instead of using only the number of cases
detected, leading to more precise and efficient measures. This type of analysis could be very useful,
considering the recent case of a new Coronavirus variant in the UK, which was only uncovered
three months later.
One limitation to our research and the proposed approach is the availability of reliable and
complete data. We do recognise that there could be some missing data, such as that related
to asymptomatic cases, where we may not have the genomic code, but could still affect the
phylogenetic tree construction. Also, the delay of data transmission and the missing details. When
the genome was sequenced compared to the observation of the symptoms, patients’ recovery,
the number of contact cases detected, the specificity of the patient: age, gender, smoker, medical
history, are all examples of very valuable data, that if provided, would add invaluable insights into
the analysis. Incorporating such information could improve the analysis to get a more accurate
view of the evolution of the genomes and their epidemiological behaviour. The other main
limitation of this research is the number of genomes that can be aligned and treated at the same
time, which is limited by the complexity of the genome sequence. Searching for new alignment
methods that can support bigger sets of genomes will be an improvement in this area as more
sequences could be compared and studied at the same time. This type of study is still showing
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an interesting approach which could reduce the time of detection and tracking of emerging
virus’s mutations.
This study also illustrates the power of data analytics in this context, by demonstrating
how the fusion of three-dimensional data (genomes, number of cases/deaths and dates) reveals
interesting and unprecedented insights into the epidemiological impact of the pandemic on the
UAE over time, which can lead to appropriate interventions to limit this impact. If other dimensions were added to the data, such as, travellers’ from outside the UAE, the health system,
people’s compliance with government advice, symptoms, social media, news etc, this data fusion
together with advanced semantically enabled analytics will lead to more significant insights that
could potentially provide the government with opportunities to be more proactive and respond to
the crisis more effectively. This could result in saving humans’ lives and minimizing the health,
social and economic impacts. As the world is preparing for a long-lasting battle with Sar-Cov-2,
improving our understanding of its strains and how to face them will become increasingly critical.
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